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Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
16-111 
Ruling Below: Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo.App., 2015) 
Cake shop and its owner sought review of the Civil Rights Commission's decision and issuance 
of cease and desist order, requiring shop and owner not to discriminate against potential 
customers because of their sexual orientation, in same-sex couple's action against shop and 
owner for discrimination based on sexual orientation under Anti-Discrimination Act, stemming 
from shop's refusal to sell couple wedding cake. The Colorado Court of Appeals, Taubman, J., 
affirmed, holding that: as a matter of first impression, adding owner as respondent to couple's 
formal complaint was permissible under relation back doctrine; owner's refusal to create cake for 
couple violated public accommodation provision of Act; cease and desist order did not compel 
shop to express celebratory message about same-sex marriage in violation of right to free speech; 
Act was neutral law of general applicability, and thus needed only to be rationally related to 
legitimate governmental interest to survive challenge under Free Exercise Clause; Free Exercise 
Clause of state constitution did not require neutral laws of general applicability to be reviewed 
under heightened, strict scrutiny; Act's proscription of sexual orientation discrimination by 
places of public accommodation was rationally related to state's interest in eliminating 
discrimination; and cease and desist order did not exceed scope of Commission's authority. 
Question Presented: Whether applying Colorado's public accommodations law to compel the 
petitioner to create expression that violates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage 
violates the free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment. 
 
Charlie CRAIG and David Mullins, Petitioners–Appellees, 
v. 
MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, INC., and any successor entity, and Jack C. Phillips, 
Respondents–Appellants, 
and 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Appellee. 
 
Colorado Court of Appeals 
Decided on August 13, 2015 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN 
This case juxtaposes the rights of 
complainants, Charlie Craig and David 
Mullins, under Colorado's public 
accommodations law to obtain a wedding 
cake to celebrate their same-sex marriage 
against the rights of respondents, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., and its owner, 
Jack C. Phillips, who contend that requiring 
them to provide such a wedding cake violates 
their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech and the free exercise of religion. 
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This appeal arises from an administrative 
decision by appellee, the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission (Commission), which 
upheld the decision of an administrative law 
judge (ALJ), who ruled in favor of Craig and 
Mullins and against Masterpiece and Phillips 
on cross-motions for summary judgment. For 
the reasons discussed below, we affirm the 
Commission's decision. 
 
I. Background 
 
In July 2012, Craig and Mullins visited 
Masterpiece, a bakery in Lakewood, 
Colorado, and requested that Phillips design 
and create a cake to celebrate their same-sex 
wedding. Phillips declined, telling them that 
he does not create wedding cakes for same-
sex weddings because of his religious beliefs, 
but advising Craig and Mullins that he would 
be happy to make and sell them any other 
baked goods. Craig and Mullins promptly left 
Masterpiece without discussing with Phillips 
any details of their wedding cake. The 
following day, Craig's mother, Deborah 
Munn, called Phillips, who advised her that 
Masterpiece did not make wedding cakes for 
same-sex weddings because of his religious 
beliefs and because Colorado did not 
recognize same-sex marriages. 
 
The ALJ found that Phillips has been a 
Christian for approximately thirty-five years 
and believes in Jesus Christ as his Lord and 
savior. Phillips believes that decorating cakes 
is a form of art, that he can honor God 
through his artistic talents, and that he would 
displease God by creating cakes for same-sex 
marriages. 
 
Craig and Mullins had planned to marry in 
Massachusetts, where same-sex marriages 
were legal, and later celebrate with friends in 
Colorado, which at that time did not 
recognize same-sex marriages. 
 
Craig and Mullins later filed charges of 
discrimination with the Colorado Civil 
Rights Division (Division), alleging 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
under the Colorado Anti–Discrimination Act 
(CADA), §§ 24–34–301 to –804, 
C.R.S.2014. After an investigation, the 
Division issued a notice of determination 
finding probable cause to credit the 
allegations of discrimination. Craig and 
Mullins then filed a formal complaint with 
the Office of Administrative Courts alleging 
that Masterpiece had discriminated against 
them in a place of public accommodation 
because of their sexual orientation in 
violation of section 24–34–601(2), 
C.R.S.2014. 
 
The parties did not dispute any material facts. 
Masterpiece and Phillips admitted that the 
bakery is a place of public accommodation 
and that they refused to sell Craig and 
Mullins a cake because of their intent to 
engage in a same-sex marriage ceremony. 
After the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment, the ALJ issued a lengthy 
written order finding in favor of Craig and 
Mullins. 
 
The ALJ's order was affirmed by the 
Commission. The Commission's final cease 
and desist order required that Masterpiece (1) 
take remedial measures, including 
comprehensive staff training and alteration to 
the company's policies to ensure compliance 
with CADA; and (2) file quarterly 
compliance reports for two years with the 
Division describing the remedial measures 
taken to comply with CADA and 
documenting all patrons who are denied 
service and the reasons for the denial. 
Masterpiece and Phillips now appeal the 
Commission's order. 
 
II. Motion to Dismiss 
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At the outset, Phillips and Masterpiece 
contend that the ALJ and the Commission 
erred in denying two motions to dismiss 
which they filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 
12(b)(1), (2), and (5). We disagree. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
We review the ALJ's ruling on a C.R.C.P. 
12(b) motion to dismiss de novo.  
B. First Motion to Dismiss—Lack of 
Jurisdiction Over Phillips 
Phillips filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
C.R.C.P. 12(b) alleging that the Commission 
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the charges 
against him. 
  
Specifically, he claimed that it lacked 
jurisdiction because Mullins named only 
“Masterpiece Cakeshop,” and not Phillips 
personally, as the respondent in the initial 
charge of discrimination filed with the 
Commission. 
 
The ALJ, applying the relation back doctrine 
of C.R.C.P. 15(c), denied the motion. He 
concluded that adding Phillips as a 
respondent to the formal complaint was 
permissible for several reasons. First, he 
noted that both the charge of discrimination 
and the formal complaint alleged identical 
conduct. He further noted that Phillips was 
aware from the beginning of the litigation 
that he was the person whose conduct was at 
issue. Finally, the ALJ found that Phillips 
should have known that, but for Mullins' 
oversight in not naming Phillips, he would 
have been named as a respondent in the 
charge of discrimination. We agree with the 
ALJ. 
Although no Colorado appellate court has 
previously addressed this issue, we conclude 
that the omission of a party's name from a 
CADA charging document should be 
considered under the relation back doctrine. 
 
C.R.C.P. 15(c), which is nearly identical to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C), contains three 
requirements which, if met, allow for a claim 
in an amended complaint against a new party 
to relate back to the filing of the original: (1) 
the claim must have arisen out of the same 
transaction or conduct set forth in the original 
complaint; (2) the new party must have 
received notice of the action within the period 
provided by law for commencing the action; 
and (3) the new party must have known or 
reasonably should have known that, “but for 
a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been 
brought against him.” “Many courts have 
liberally construed to find that amendments 
simply adding or dropping parties, as well as 
amendments that actually substitute 
defendants, fall within the ambit of the rule.”  
Courts interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C) 
have concluded that the pertinent question 
when amending any claim to add a new party 
is whether the party to be added, when 
viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably 
prudent person, should have expected that the 
original complaint might be altered to add the 
new party.  
 
Here, the ALJ properly found that the three 
requirements for application of the relation 
back doctrine were satisfied. First, the claim 
against Phillips arose out of the same 
transaction as the original complaint against 
Masterpiece. Second, Phillips received 
timely notice of the original charge filed 
against Masterpiece. Indeed, he responded to 
it on behalf of Masterpiece. Third, Phillips 
knew or reasonably should have known that 
the original complaint should have named 
him as a respondent. The charging document 
frequently referred to Phillips by name and 
identified him as the owner of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop and the person who told Craig and 
Mullins that his standard business practice 
was to refuse to make wedding cakes for 
same-sex weddings. Consequently, Phillips 
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suffered no prejudice from not being named 
in the original complaint. 
 
Based on these findings, we conclude that the 
ALJ did not err in applying C.R.C.P. 15(c)'s 
“relation back” rule. Accordingly, we 
conclude that the ALJ did not err when he 
denied Phillips' motion to dismiss. 
 
C. Second Motion to Dismiss—Public 
Accommodation Charges 
 
Phillips and Masterpiece jointly filed the 
second motion to dismiss. They alleged that 
the Commission lacked jurisdiction and 
failed to state a claim in its notice of 
determination as required by section 24–34–
306(2)(b)(II), C.R.S.2014. We disagree. 
Section 24–34–306(2)(b)(II) provides: “If the 
director or the director's designee determines 
that probable cause exists, the director or the 
director's designee shall serve the respondent 
with written notice stating with specificity 
the legal authority and jurisdiction of the 
commission and the matters of fact and law 
asserted.” 
 
The Division's letter of probable cause 
determination erroneously referenced section 
24–34–402, C.R.S.2014, the employment 
practices section of CADA, and not section 
24–34–601(2), the public accommodations 
section under which Craig and Mullins filed 
their complaint. According to Phillips and 
Masterpiece, this erroneous citation violated 
section 24–34–306(2)(b)(II)'s requirement 
that respondents be notified “with 
specificity” of the “legal authority and 
jurisdiction of the commission.” 
The ALJ denied the second motion to 
dismiss. He concluded that Masterpiece and 
Phillips could not have been misled by the 
error, because “[t]here is no dispute that this 
case does not involve either an allegation or 
evidence of discriminatory employment 
practices.” Again, we agree with the ALJ. 
The charge of discrimination and the notice 
of determination correctly referenced section 
24–34–601, the public accommodations 
section of CADA, several times. Further, the 
director's designee who drafted the notice of 
determination with the incorrect citation 
signed an affidavit explaining that the 
reference to section 24–34–402 was a 
typographical error, and that the reference 
should have been to section 24–34–601. 
Because Masterpiece and Phillips could not 
have been misled about the legal basis for the 
Commission's findings, we perceive no error 
in the Commission's refusal to dismiss the 
charges against Masterpiece and Phillips 
because of a typographical error.  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ did 
not err when he denied Phillips' and 
Masterpiece's second motion to dismiss. 
 
III. CADA Violation 
 
Masterpiece contends that the ALJ erred in 
concluding that its refusal to create a wedding 
cake for Craig and Mullins was “because of” 
their sexual orientation. Specifically, 
Masterpiece asserts that its refusal to create 
the cake was “because of” its opposition to 
same-sex marriage, not because of its 
opposition to their sexual orientation. We 
conclude that the act of same-sex marriage is 
closely correlated to Craig's and Mullins' 
sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did 
not err when he found that Masterpiece's 
refusal to create a wedding cake for Craig and 
Mullins was “because of” their sexual 
orientation, in violation of CADA. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Whether Masterpiece violated CADA is a 
question of law reviewed de novo. 
  
B. Applicable Law 
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Section 24–34–601(2)(a), C.R.S.2014, reads, 
as relevant here: 
 
    It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful 
for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, 
withhold from, or deny to an individual or a 
group, because of ... sexual orientation ... the 
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of a place of public 
accommodation.... 
 
In Tesmer v. Colorado High School 
Activities Association, 140 P.3d 249, 254 
(Colo.App.2006), a division of this court 
concluded that to prevail on a discrimination 
claim under CADA, plaintiffs must prove 
that, “but for” their membership in an 
enumerated class, they would not have been 
denied the full privileges of a place of public 
accommodation. The division explained that 
plaintiffs need not establish that their 
membership in the enumerated class was the 
“sole” cause of the denial of services. Id. 
Rather, it is sufficient that they show that the 
discriminatory action was based in whole or 
in part on their membership in the protected 
class. 
 
Further, a “place of public accommodation” 
is “any place of business engaged in any sales 
to the public and any place offering services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations to the public, including but 
not limited to any business offering 
wholesale or retail sales to the public.” 
Finally, CADA defines “sexual orientation” 
as “an individual's orientation toward 
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, 
or transgender status or another individual's 
perception thereof.”  
 
C. Analysis 
 
Masterpiece asserts that it did not decline to 
make Craig's and Mullins' wedding cake 
“because of” their sexual orientation. It 
argues that it does not object to or refuse to 
serve patrons because of their sexual 
orientation, and that it assured Craig and 
Mullins that it would design and create any 
other bakery product for them, just not a 
wedding cake. Masterpiece asserts that its 
decision was solely “because of” Craig's and 
Mullins' intended conduct—entering into 
marriage with a same-sex partner—and the 
celebratory message about same-sex 
marriage that baking a wedding cake would 
convey. Therefore, because its refusal to 
serve Craig and Mullins was not “because of” 
their sexual orientation, Masterpiece 
contends that it did not violate CADA. We 
disagree. 
 
Masterpiece argues that the ALJ made two 
incorrect presumptions. First, it contends that 
the ALJ incorrectly presumed that opposing 
same-sex marriage is tantamount to opposing 
the rights of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to 
the equal enjoyment of public 
accommodations. Second, it contends that the 
ALJ incorrectly presumed that only gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual couples engage in 
same-sex marriage. 
 
Masterpiece thus distinguishes between 
discrimination based on a person's status and 
discrimination based on conduct closely 
correlated with that status. However, the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized 
that such distinctions are generally 
inappropriate.  
 
Further, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
Supreme Court equated laws precluding 
same-sex marriage to discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. The Court stated: 
“The nature of marriage is that, through its 
enduring bond, two persons together can find 
other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, 
and spirituality. This is true for all persons, 
whatever their sexual orientation.” “Were the 
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Court to stay its hand ... it still would deny 
gays and lesbians many rights and 
responsibilities intertwined with marriage.” 
  
In these decisions, the Supreme Court 
recognized that, in some cases, conduct 
cannot be divorced from status. This is so 
when the conduct is so closely correlated 
with the status that it is engaged in 
exclusively or predominantly by persons who 
have that particular status. We conclude that 
the act of same-sex marriage constitutes such 
conduct because it is “engaged in exclusively 
or predominantly” by gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals. Masterpiece's distinction, 
therefore, is one without a difference. But for 
their sexual orientation, Craig and Mullins 
would not have sought to enter into a same-
sex marriage, and but for their intent to do so, 
Masterpiece would not have denied them its 
services. 
 
In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, the 
New Mexico Supreme Court rejected a 
similar argument raised by a wedding 
photographer. The court concluded that by 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, New Mexico's 
antidiscrimination law similarly protects 
“conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual 
orientation,” including the act of same-sex 
marriage. The court observed that 
“[o]therwise, we would interpret [the New 
Mexico public accommodations law] as 
protecting same-gender couples against 
discriminatory treatment, but only to the 
extent that they do not openly display their 
same-gender sexual orientation.” We agree 
with the reasoning of the New Mexico 
Supreme Court. 
Masterpiece relies on Bray v. Alexandria 
Women's Health Clinic, which declined to 
equate opposition to voluntary abortion with 
discrimination against women. As in Bray, it 
asks us to decline to equate opposition to 
same-sex marriage with discrimination 
against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 
Masterpiece's reliance on Bray is misplaced. 
Bray considered whether the defendants, 
several organizations that coordinated 
antiabortion demonstrations, could be subject 
to tort liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) 
(1988). Established precedent required that 
plaintiffs in section 1985(3) actions prove 
that “some ... class-based, invidiously 
discriminatory animus [lay] behind the 
[defendant's] actions.” However, CADA 
requires no such showing of “animus.”  
 
Further, Masterpiece admits that it refused to 
serve Craig and Mullins “because of” its 
opposition to persons entering into same-sex 
marriages, conduct which we conclude is 
closely correlated with sexual orientation. 
Therefore, even if we assume that CADA 
requires plaintiffs to establish an intent to 
discriminate, as in section 1985(3) action, the 
ALJ reasonably could have inferred from 
Masterpiece's conduct an intent to 
discriminate against Craig and Mullins 
“because of” their sexual orientation. 
 
We also note that although the Bray Court 
held that opposition to voluntary abortion did 
not equate to discrimination against women, 
it observed that “[s]ome activities may be 
such an irrational object of disfavor that, if 
they are targeted, and if they also happen to 
be engaged in exclusively or predominantly 
by a particular class of people, an intent to 
disfavor that class can readily be presumed.” 
The Court provided, by way of example, that 
“[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on 
Jews.” Likewise, discrimination on the basis 
of one's opposition to same-sex marriage is 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
 
We reject Masterpiece's related argument that 
its willingness to sell birthday cakes, cookies, 
and other non-wedding cake products to gay 
and lesbian customers establishes that it did 
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not violate CADA. Masterpiece's potential 
compliance with CADA in this respect does 
not permit it to refuse services to Craig and 
Mullins that it otherwise offers to the general 
public.  
 
Finally, Masterpiece argues that the ALJ 
wrongly presumed that only same-sex 
couples engage in same-sex marriage. In 
support, it references the case of two 
heterosexual New Zealanders who married in 
connection with a radio talk show contest. 
However, as the Bray court explained, we do 
not distinguish between conduct and status 
where the targeted conduct is engaged in 
“predominantly by a particular class of 
people.” An isolated example of two 
heterosexual men marrying does not 
persuade us that same-sex marriage is not 
predominantly, and almost exclusively, 
engaged in by gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 
Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ did not 
err by concluding that Masterpiece refused to 
create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins 
“because of” their sexual orientation. CADA 
prohibits places of public accommodations 
from basing their refusal to serve customers 
on their sexual orientation, and Masterpiece 
violated Colorado's public accommodations 
law by refusing to create a wedding cake for 
Craig's and Mullins' same-sex wedding 
celebration. 
 
Having concluded that Masterpiece violated 
CADA, we next consider whether the 
Commission's application of the law under 
these circumstances violated Masterpiece's 
rights to freedom of speech and free exercise 
of religion protected by the United States and 
Colorado Constitutions. 
 
IV. Compelled Expressive Conduct and 
Symbolic Speech 
 
Masterpiece contends that the Commission's 
cease and desist order compels speech in 
violation of the First Amendment by 
requiring it to create wedding cakes for same-
sex weddings. Masterpiece argues that 
wedding cakes inherently convey a 
celebratory message about marriage and, 
therefore, the Commission's order 
unconstitutionally compels it to convey a 
celebratory message about same-sex 
marriage in conflict with its religious beliefs. 
We disagree. We conclude that the 
Commission's order merely requires that 
Masterpiece not discriminate against 
potential customers in violation of CADA 
and that such conduct, even if compelled by 
the government, is not sufficiently expressive 
to warrant First Amendment protections. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Whether the Commission's order 
unconstitutionally infringes on Masterpiece's 
right to the freedom of expression protected 
by the First Amendment is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  
 
B. Applicable Law 
 
The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits laws “abridging the 
freedom of speech.” Article II, section 10 of 
the Colorado Constitution, which provides 
greater protection of free speech than does 
the First Amendment provides that “[n]o law 
shall be passed impairing the freedom of 
speech; every person shall be free to speak, 
write or publish whatever he will on any 
subject.” 
 
The freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment includes the “right to refrain 
from speaking” and prohibits the government 
from telling people what they must say. This 
compelled speech doctrine, on which 
Masterpiece relies, was first articulated by 
the Supreme Court in West Virginia Board of 
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Education v. Barnette, and has been applied 
in two lines of cases. 
 
The first line of cases prohibits the 
government from requiring that an individual 
“speak the government's message.”  
These cases establish that the government 
cannot “prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion” by forcing individuals to 
publicly disseminate its own ideological 
message. The government also cannot 
require “the dissemination of an ideological 
message by displaying it on [an individual's] 
private property in a manner and for the 
express purpose that it be observed and read 
by the public.”  
 
The second line of compelled speech cases 
establishes that the government may not 
require an individual “to host or 
accommodate another speaker's message.” 
For example, in Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a Florida law which provided 
that, if a local newspaper criticized a 
candidate for public office, the candidate 
could demand that the newspaper publish his 
or her reply to the criticism free of charge. 
Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission of California, 
the Supreme Court struck down a California 
Public Utilities Commission regulation that 
permitted third-party intervenors in 
ratemaking proceedings to include messages 
in the utility's billing envelopes, which it 
distributed to customers. These cases 
establish that the government may not 
commandeer a private speaker's means of 
accessing its audience by requiring that the 
speaker disseminate a third-party's message. 
 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that 
some forms of conduct are symbolic speech 
and deserve First Amendment protections. 
However, because “[i]t is possible to find 
some kernel of expression in almost every 
activity a person undertakes,” City of Dallas 
v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court has rejected 
the view that “conduct can be labeled 
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the 
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” 
Rather, First Amendment protections extend 
only to conduct that is “inherently 
expressive.”  
 
In deciding whether conduct is “inherently 
expressive,” we ask whether “ ‘[a]n intent to 
convey a particularized message was present, 
and [whether] the likelihood was great that 
the message would be understood by those 
who viewed it.’ ” The message need not be 
“narrow,” or “succinctly articulable.” The 
Supreme Court has recognized expressive 
conduct in several cases.  
 
However, other decisions have declined to 
recognize certain conduct as expressive.  
Masterpiece's contentions involve claims of 
compelled expressive conduct. In such cases, 
the threshold question is whether the 
compelled conduct is sufficiently expressive 
to trigger First Amendment protections. The 
party asserting that conduct is expressive 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
First Amendment applies and the party must 
advance more than a mere “plausible 
contention” that its conduct is expressive.  
 
Finally, a conclusion that the Commission's 
order compels expressive conduct does not 
necessarily mean that the order is 
unconstitutional. If it does compel such 
conduct, the question is then whether the 
government has sufficient justification for 
regulating the conduct. The Supreme Court 
has recognized that “when ‘speech’ and ‘non-
speech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the non-
speech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” 
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In other words, the government can regulate 
communicative conduct if it has an important 
interest unrelated to the suppression of the 
message and if the impact on the 
communication is no more than necessary to 
achieve the government's purpose.  
 
C. Analysis 
 
Masterpiece contends that wedding cakes 
inherently communicate a celebratory 
message about marriage and that, by forcing 
it to make cakes for same-sex weddings, the 
Commission's cease and desist order 
unconstitutionally compels it to express a 
celebratory message about same-sex 
marriage that it does not support. We 
disagree. 
 
The ALJ rejected Masterpiece's argument 
that preparing a wedding cake for same-sex 
weddings necessarily involves expressive 
conduct. He recognized that baking and 
creating a wedding cake involves skill and 
artistry, but nonetheless concluded that, 
because Phillips refused to prepare a cake for 
Craig and Mullins before any discussion of 
the cake's design, the ALJ could not 
determine whether Craig's and Mullins' 
desired wedding cake would constitute 
symbolic speech subject to First Amendment 
protections. 
 
Masterpiece argues that the ALJ wrongly 
considered whether the “conduct” of creating 
a cake is expressive, and not whether the 
product of that conduct, the wedding cake 
itself, constitutes symbolic expression. It 
asserts that the ALJ wrongly employed the 
test for expressive conduct instead of that for 
compelled speech. However, Masterpiece's 
argument mistakenly presumes that the legal 
doctrines involving compelled speech and 
expressive conduct are mutually exclusive. 
As noted, because the First Amendment only 
protects conduct that conveys a message, the 
threshold question in cases involving 
expressive conduct—or as here, compelled 
expressive conduct—is whether the conduct 
in question is sufficiently expressive so as to 
trigger First Amendment protections. 
 
We begin by identifying the compelled 
conduct in question. As noted, the 
Commission's order requires that 
Masterpiece “cease and desist from 
discriminating against [Craig and Mullins] 
and other same-sex couples by refusing to 
sell them wedding cakes or any product [it] 
would sell to heterosexual couples.” 
Therefore, the compelled conduct is the 
Colorado government's mandate that 
Masterpiece comport with CADA by not 
basing its decision to serve a potential client, 
at least in part, on the client's sexual 
orientation. This includes a requirement that 
Masterpiece sell wedding cakes to same-sex 
couples, but only if it wishes to serve 
heterosexual couples in the same manner. 
 
Next, we ask whether, by comporting with 
CADA and ceasing to discriminate against 
potential customers on the basis of their 
sexual orientation, Masterpiece conveys a 
particularized message celebrating same-sex 
marriage, and whether the likelihood is great 
that a reasonable observer would both 
understand the message and attribute that 
message to Masterpiece.  
 
We conclude that the act of designing and 
selling a wedding cake to all customers free 
of discrimination does not convey a 
celebratory message about same-sex 
weddings likely to be understood by those 
who view it. We further conclude that, to the 
extent that the public infers from a 
Masterpiece wedding cake a message 
celebrating same-sex marriage, that message 
is more likely to be attributed to the customer 
than to Masterpiece. 
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First, Masterpiece does not convey a message 
supporting same-sex marriages merely by 
abiding by the law and serving its customers 
equally. In FAIR, several law schools 
challenged a federal law that denied funding 
to institutions of higher education that either 
prohibit or prevent military recruiters from 
accessing their campuses. The law schools 
argued that, by forcing them to treat military 
and nonmilitary recruiters alike, the law 
compelled them to send “the message that 
they see nothing wrong with the military's 
policies [regarding gays in the military], 
when they do.” The Court rejected this 
argument, observing that students “can 
appreciate the difference between speech a 
school sponsors and speech the school 
permits because legally required to do so.” 
  
As in FAIR, we conclude that, because 
CADA prohibits all places of public 
accommodation from discriminating against 
customers because of their sexual orientation, 
it is unlikely that the public would view 
Masterpiece's creation of a cake for a same-
sex wedding celebration as an endorsement 
of that conduct. Rather, we conclude that a 
reasonable observer would understand that 
Masterpiece's compliance with the law is not 
a reflection of its own beliefs. 
 
The Elane Photography court distinguished 
Wooley and Barnette, and similarly 
concluded that New Mexico's public 
accommodations law did not compel the 
photographer to convey any particularized 
message, but rather “only mandates that if 
Elane Photography operates a business as a 
public accommodation, it cannot 
discriminate against potential clients based 
on their sexual orientation.” It concluded that 
“[r]easonable observers are unlikely to 
interpret Elane Photography's photographs as 
an endorsement of the photographed events.” 
We are persuaded by this reasoning and 
similarly conclude that CADA does not 
compel expressive conduct. 
 
We do not suggest that Masterpiece's status 
as a for-profit bakery strips it of its First 
Amendment speech protections. However, 
we must consider the allegedly expressive 
conduct within “the context in which it 
occurred.” The public recognizes that, as a 
for-profit bakery, Masterpiece charges its 
customers for its goods and services. The fact 
that an entity charges for its goods and 
services reduces the likelihood that a 
reasonable observer will believe that it 
supports the message expressed in its 
finished product. Nothing in the record 
supports the conclusion that a reasonable 
observer would interpret Masterpiece's 
providing a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple as an endorsement of same-sex 
marriage, rather than a reflection of its desire 
to conduct business in accordance with 
Colorado's public accommodations law.  
 
For the same reason, this case also differs 
from Hurley, on which Masterpiece relies. 
There, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Massachusetts' public accommodations 
statute could not require parade organizers to 
include among the marchers in a St. Patrick's 
Day parade a group imparting a message the 
organizers did not wish to convey. Central to 
the Court's conclusion was the “inherent 
expressiveness of marching to make a point,” 
and its observation that a “parade's overall 
message is distilled from the individual 
presentations along the way, and each unit's 
expression is perceived by spectators as part 
of the whole.” The Court concluded that 
spectators would likely attribute each 
marcher's message to the parade organizers 
as a whole.  
 
In contrast, it is unlikely that the public would 
understand Masterpiece's sale of wedding 
cakes to same-sex couples as endorsing a 
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celebratory message about same-sex 
marriage.  
 
By selling a wedding cake to a same-sex 
couple, Masterpiece does not necessarily lead 
an observer to conclude that the bakery 
supports its customer's conduct. The public 
has no way of knowing the reasons 
supporting Masterpiece's decision to serve or 
decline to serve a same-sex couple. Someone 
observing that a commercial bakery created a 
wedding cake for a straight couple or that it 
did not create one for a gay couple would 
have no way of deciphering whether the 
bakery's conduct took place because of its 
views on same-sex marriage or for some 
other reason. 
 
We also find the Supreme Court's holding in 
Carrigan instructive. There, the Court 
concluded that legislators do not have a 
personal, First Amendment right to vote in 
the legislative body in which they serve, and 
that restrictions on legislators' voting 
imposed by a law requiring recusal in 
instances of conflicts of interest are not 
restrictions on their protected speech. The 
Court rejected the argument that the act of 
voting was expressive conduct subject to 
First Amendment protections. Although the 
Court recognized that voting “discloses ... 
that the legislator wishes (for whatever 
reason) that the proposition on the floor be 
adopted,” it “symbolizes nothing” and is not 
“an act of communication” because it does 
not convey the legislator's reasons for the 
vote.  
 
We recognize that a wedding cake, in some 
circumstances, may convey a particularized 
message celebrating same-sex marriage and, 
in such cases, First Amendment speech 
protections may be implicated. However, we 
need not reach this issue. We note, again, that 
Phillips denied Craig's and Mullins' request 
without any discussion regarding the 
wedding cake's design or any possible written 
inscriptions. 
 
Finally, CADA does not preclude 
Masterpiece from expressing its views on 
same-sex marriage—including its religious 
opposition to it—and the bakery remains free 
to disassociate itself from its customers' 
viewpoints. We recognize that section 24–
34–601(2)(a) of CADA prohibits 
Masterpiece from displaying or 
disseminating a notice stating that it will 
refuse to provide its services based on a 
customer's desire to engage in same-sex 
marriage or indicating that those engaging in 
same-sex marriage are unwelcome at the 
bakery. However, CADA does not prevent 
Masterpiece from posting a disclaimer in the 
store or on the Internet indicating that the 
provision of its services does not constitute 
an endorsement or approval of conduct 
protected by CADA. Masterpiece could also 
post or otherwise disseminate a message 
indicating that CADA requires it not to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation and other protected 
characteristics. Such a message would likely 
have the effect of disassociating Masterpiece 
from its customers' conduct.  
 
Therefore, we conclude that the 
Commission's order requiring Masterpiece 
not to discriminate against potential 
customers because of their sexual orientation 
does not force it to engage in compelled 
expressive conduct in violation of the First 
Amendment. Accordingly, because we 
conclude that the compelled conduct here is 
not expressive, the State need not show that 
it has an important interest in enforcing 
CADA. 
 
V. First Amendment and Article II, 
Section 4—Free Exercise of Religion 
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Next, Masterpiece contends that the 
Commission's order unconstitutionally 
infringes on its right to the free exercise of 
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment 
of the United States Constitution and article 
II, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution. We 
conclude that CADA is a neutral law of 
general applicability and, therefore, offends 
neither the First Amendment nor article II, 
section 4. 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
Whether the Commission's order 
unconstitutionally infringes on Masterpiece's 
free exercise rights, protected by the First 
Amendment and article II, section 4, is a 
question of law that we review de novo.  
 
B. Applicable Law 
 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment provides: “Congress shall make 
no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion].” The First Amendment is binding 
on the States through incorporation by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Article II, section 4 
of the Colorado Constitution provides: “The 
free exercise and enjoyment of religious 
profession and worship, without 
discrimination, shall forever hereafter be 
guaranteed.” 
 
 “The free exercise of religion means, first 
and foremost, the right to believe and profess 
whatever religious doctrine one desires.” 
Free exercise of religion also involves the 
“performance of (or abstention from) 
physical acts.”  
Before the Supreme Court's decision in 
Smith, the Court consistently used a 
balancing test to determine whether a 
challenged government action violated the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. That test considered whether 
the challenged government action imposed a 
substantial burden on the practice of religion, 
and, if so, whether that burden was justified 
by a compelling government interest. 
  
In Smith, the Court disavowed Sherbert 's 
balancing test and concluded that the Free 
Exercise Clause “does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a 
valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).” The Court held 
that neutral laws of general applicability need 
only be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest in order to survive a 
constitutional challenge. As a general rule, 
such laws do not offend the Free Exercise 
Clause. 
 
However, if a law burdens a religious practice 
and is not neutral or not generally applicable, 
it “must be justified by a compelling 
government interest” and must be narrowly 
tailored to advance that interest.  
 
C. Analysis 
 
1. First Amendment Free Exercise 
 
Masterpiece contends that its claim is not 
governed by Smith 's rational basis exception 
to general strict scrutiny review of free 
exercise claims for two reasons: (1) CADA is 
not “neutral and generally applicable” and (2) 
its claim is a “hybrid” that implicates both its 
free exercise and free expression rights. 
Again, we disagree. 
 
First, we address Masterpiece's contention 
that CADA is not neutral and not generally 
applicable. A law is not neutral “if the object 
of a law is to infringe upon or restrict 
practices because of their religious 
motivation.” A law is not generally 
applicable when it imposes burdens on 
religiously motivated conduct while 
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permitting exceptions for secular conduct or 
for favored religions. The Supreme Court has 
explained that an improper intent to 
discriminate can be inferred where a law is a 
“religious gerrymander[ ]” that burdens 
religious conduct while exempting similar 
secular activity. If a law is either not neutral 
or not generally applicable, it “must be 
justified by a compelling governmental 
interest and must be narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.”  
 
The Court has found only one law to be 
neither neutral nor generally applicable. In 
Church of Lukumi, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice. The law 
applied to any individual or group that “kills, 
slaughters, or sacrifices animals for any type 
of ritual, regardless of whether or not the 
flesh or blood of the animals is to be 
consumed.”  
 
Considering that the ordinance's terms such 
as “sacrifice” and “ritual” could be either 
secular or religious, the Court nevertheless 
concluded that the law was not neutral 
because its purpose was to impede certain 
practices of the Santeria religion. The Court 
further concluded that the law was not 
generally applicable because it exempted the 
killing of animals for several secular 
purposes, including the killing of animals in 
secular slaughterhouses, hunting, fishing, 
euthanasia of unwanted animals, and 
extermination of pests, as well as the killing 
of animals by some religions, including at 
kosher slaughterhouses. 
a. Neutral Law of General Applicability 
Masterpiece contends that, like the law in 
Church of Lukumi, CADA is neither neutral 
nor generally applicable. First, it argues that 
CADA is not generally applicable because it 
provides exemptions for “places principally 
used for religious purposes” such as 
churches, synagogues, and mosques, as well 
as places that restrict admission to one gender 
because of a bona fide relationship to its 
services. Second, it argues that the law is not 
neutral because it exempts “places 
principally used for religious purposes,” but 
not Masterpiece. 
 
We conclude that CADA is generally 
applicable, notwithstanding its exemptions. 
A law need not apply to every individual and 
entity to be generally applicable; rather, it is 
generally applicable so long as it does not 
regulate only religiously motivated conduct. 
CADA does not discriminate on the basis of 
religion; rather, it exempts certain public 
accommodations that are “principally used 
for religious purposes.”  
 
In this regard, CADA does not impede the 
free exercise of religion. Rather, its 
exemption for “places principally used for 
religious purposes” reflects an attempt by the 
General Assembly to reduce legal burdens on 
religious organizations and comport with the 
free exercise doctrine. Such exemptions are 
commonplace throughout Colorado law, and, 
in some cases, are constitutionally mandated.  
Further, CADA is generally applicable 
because it does not exempt secular conduct 
from its reach. In this respect, CADA's 
exemption for places that restrict admission 
to one gender because of a bona fide 
relationship to its services does not 
discriminate on the basis of religion. On its 
face, it applies equally to religious and 
nonreligious conduct, and therefore is 
generally applicable. 
 
Second, we conclude that CADA is neutral. 
  
Masterpiece asserts that CADA is not neutral 
because, although it exempts “places 
primarily used for religious purposes,” 
Masterpiece is not exempt. However, 
Masterpiece does not contend that its bakery 
is primarily used for religious purposes. 
31 
  
CADA forbids all discrimination based on 
sexual orientation regardless of its 
motivation. Further, the existence of an 
exemption for religious entities undermines 
Masterpiece's contention that the law 
discriminates against its conduct because of 
its religious character.  
Finally, we reiterate that CADA does not 
compel Masterpiece to support or endorse 
any particular religious views. The law 
merely prohibits Masterpiece from 
discriminating against potential customers on 
account of their sexual orientation. As one 
court observed in addressing a similar free 
exercise challenge to the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act: 
 
    Undoubtedly defendant ... has a 
constitutional right to espouse the religious 
beliefs of his own choosing, however, he 
does not have the absolute right to exercise 
and practice such beliefs in utter disregard of 
the clear constitutional rights of other 
citizens. This Court refuses to lend credence 
or support to his position that he has a 
constitutional right to refuse to serve 
members of the Negro race in his business 
establishment upon the ground that to do so 
would violate his sacred religious beliefs. 
 
Likewise, Masterpiece remains free to 
continue espousing its religious beliefs, 
including its opposition to same-sex 
marriage. However, if it wishes to operate as 
a public accommodation and conduct 
business within the State of Colorado, CADA 
prohibits it from picking and choosing 
customers based on their sexual orientation. 
Therefore, we conclude that CADA was not 
designed to impede religious conduct and 
does not impose burdens on religious conduct 
not imposed on secular conduct. 
Accordingly, CADA is a neutral law of 
general applicability. 
 
b. “Hybrid” Rights Claim 
 
Next, we address Masterpiece's contention 
that its claim is not governed by Smith 's 
rational basis standard and that strict scrutiny 
review applies because its contention is a 
“hybrid” of both free exercise rights and free 
expression rights. 
 
In Smith, the Supreme Court distinguished its 
holding from earlier cases applying strict 
scrutiny to laws infringing free exercise 
rights, explaining that the “only decisions in 
which we have held that the First 
Amendment bars application of a neutral, 
generally applicable law to religiously 
motivated actions have involved not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise 
Clause in conjunction with other 
constitutional protections.” Masterpiece 
argues that this language created an 
exception for “hybrid-rights” claims, holding 
that a party can still establish a violation of 
the Free Exercise Clause, even where the 
challenged law is neutral and generally 
applicable, by showing that the claim 
comprises both the right to free exercise of 
religion and an independent constitutional 
right. 
 
We note that Colorado's appellate courts have 
not applied the “hybrid-rights” exception, 
and several decisions have cast doubt on its 
validity. Regardless, having concluded above 
that the Commission's order does not 
implicate Masterpiece's freedom of 
expression, even if we assume the “hybrid-
rights” exception exists, it would not apply 
here. 
Accordingly, we hold that CADA is a neutral 
law of general applicability, and does not 
offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
 
2. Article II, Section 4 Free Exercise of 
Religion 
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Masterpiece argues that, although neutral 
laws of general applicability do not violate 
the First Amendment, the Free Exercise 
Clause of the Colorado Constitution requires 
that we review such laws under heightened, 
strict scrutiny. We disagree. 
 
Masterpiece gives two reasons supporting 
this assertion. First, it argues that Colorado 
appellate courts uniformly apply strict 
scrutiny to laws infringing fundamental 
rights. Second, it argues that the Colorado 
Constitution provides broader protections for 
individual rights than the United States 
Constitution.  
 
We recognize that, with regard to some 
individual rights, the Colorado Constitution 
has been interpreted more broadly than the 
United States Constitution, and that we apply 
strict scrutiny to many infringements of 
fundamental rights. However, the Colorado 
Supreme Court has also recognized that 
article II, section 4 embodies “the same 
values of free exercise and governmental 
noninvolvement secured by the religious 
clauses of the First Amendment.”  
 
Colorado appellate courts have consistently 
analyzed similar free exercise claims under 
the United States and Colorado 
Constitutions, and have regularly relied on 
federal precedent in interpreting article II, 
section 4. Finally, the Colorado Supreme 
Court has never indicated that an alternative 
analysis should apply. 
 
Given the consistency with which article II, 
section 4 has been interpreted using First 
Amendment case law—and in the absence of 
Colorado Supreme Court precedent 
suggesting otherwise—we hesitate to depart 
from First Amendment precedent in 
analyzing Masterpiece's claims. Therefore, 
we see no reason why Smith 's holding—that 
neutral laws of general applicability do not 
offend the Free Exercise Clause—is not 
equally applicable to claims under article II, 
section 4, and we reject Masterpiece's 
contention that the Colorado Constitution 
requires the application of a heightened 
scrutiny test. 
 
3. Rational Basis Review 
 
Having concluded that CADA is neutral and 
generally applicable, we easily conclude that 
it is rationally related to Colorado's interest in 
eliminating discrimination in places of public 
accommodation. The Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that states have a 
compelling interest in eliminating such 
discrimination and that statutes like CADA 
further that interest.  
 
Without CADA, businesses could 
discriminate against potential patrons based 
on their sexual orientation. Such 
discrimination in places of public 
accommodation has measurable adverse 
economic effects. CADA creates a hospitable 
environment for all consumers by preventing 
discrimination on the basis of certain 
characteristics, including sexual orientation. 
In doing so, it prevents the economic and 
social balkanization prevalent when 
businesses decide to serve only their own 
“kind,” and ensures that the goods and 
services provided by public accommodations 
are available to all of the state's citizens. 
 
Therefore, CADA's proscription of sexual 
orientation discrimination by places of public 
accommodation is a reasonable regulation 
that does not offend the Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment and article 
II, section 4. 
 
VI. Discovery Requests and Protective 
Order 
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We also disagree with Masterpiece's 
contention that the ALJ abused his discretion 
by denying it discovery as to the type of 
wedding cake Craig and Mullins intended to 
order and details of their wedding ceremony.  
We agree with the ALJ's conclusion that 
these subjects were not relevant in resolving 
the essential issues at trial. The only issues 
before the ALJ were (1) whether Masterpiece 
violated CADA by categorically refusing to 
serve Craig and Mullins because of its 
opposition to same-sex marriage and, if so, 
(2) whether CADA, as applied to 
Masterpiece, violated its rights to freedom of 
expression and free exercise of religion. 
Evidence pertaining to Craig's and Mullins' 
wedding ceremony—including the nature of 
the cake they served—had no bearing on the 
legality of Masterpiece's conduct. The 
decision to categorically deny service to 
Craig and Mullins was based only on their 
request for a wedding cake and Masterpiece's 
own beliefs about same-sex marriage. 
Because Craig and Mullins never conveyed 
any details of their desired cake to 
Masterpiece, evidence about their wedding 
cake and details of their wedding ceremony 
were not relevant. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ did 
not abuse his discretion by denying 
Masterpiece's requested discovery. 
 
VII. Commission's Cease and Desist Order 
 
Finally, we reject Masterpiece's contention 
that the Commission's cease and desist order 
exceeded the scope of its statutory authority. 
Where the Commission finds that CADA has 
been violated, section 24–34–306(9) 
provides that it “shall issue and cause to be 
served upon the respondent an order 
requiring such respondent to cease and desist 
from such discriminatory or unfair practice 
and to take such action as it may order” in 
accordance with the provisions of CADA.  
 
Masterpiece argues that the Commission 
does not have the authority to issue a cease 
and desist order applicable to unidentified 
parties, but rather, it may only issue orders 
with respect to the specific complaint or 
alleged discriminatory conduct in each 
proceeding. We disagree with Masterpiece's 
reading of the statute. 
 
First, individual remedies are “merely 
secondary and incidental” to CADA's 
primary purpose of eradicating 
discriminatory practices.  
 
Further, Masterpiece admitted that its refusal 
to provide a wedding cake for Craig and 
Mullins was pursuant to the company's policy 
to decline orders for wedding cakes for same-
sex weddings and marriage ceremonies. The 
record reflects that Masterpiece refused to 
make wedding cakes for several other same-
sex couples. In this respect, the Commission's 
order was aimed at the specific 
“discriminatory or unfair practice” involved 
in Craig's and Mullins' complaint.  
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Commission's cease and desist order did not 
exceed the scope of its powers. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The Commission's order is affirmed. 
 
CHIEF JUDGE LOEB and JUDGE 
BERGER concur. 
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“A baker refused to make a cake for a gay couple due to religious 
beliefs. Supreme Court will rule on the case in fall” 
 
The Los Angeles Times 
David G. Savage 
June 26, 2017 
 
The Supreme Court said Monday that it 
would hear a major religious liberties case 
that could grant new freedoms to businesses 
to discriminate against gays and lesbians — 
and potentially others — based on the faith of 
the owners. 
The case involves the Christian owner of a 
Colorado bakery who refused to make a 
wedding cake for a same-sex couple. 
The high-profile dispute pits the rights of 
religious individuals against gay rights, two 
issues that have been at the forefront of 
several recent Supreme Court decisions. Both 
are high priorities for Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy, whose vote in this matter will 
probably be key. 
In the past, Kennedy has been both a strong 
supporter of gay rights and a defender of 
religious liberty. 
The Colorado case is likely to become one of 
the court’s most contentious cases next term. 
It could decide whether business owners are 
allowed to cite their religious views as a 
reason for refusing to serve gay and lesbian 
couples. Potentially, it could sweep even 
more broadly, opening a religious exemption 
to civil rights laws that could allow 
discrimination against other groups. 
The case, to be heard in the fall, could have a 
wide effect in states like California that 
prohibit discrimination against people based 
on their sexual orientation. 
No federal law requires businesses to serve 
all customers without regard to their sexual 
orientation, but 21 states have “public 
accommodations” laws that prohibit 
discrimination against gays and lesbians. 
States with such anti-discrimination laws are 
mostly in the West, East Coast and upper 
Midwest. No state in the South or on the 
Great Plains has such a law. 
Supreme Court won't hear a California gun 
case, leaving in place the state's strict limits 
on concealed weapons 
Colorado is one of the states whose laws 
protect gay couples, and Jack Phillips, the 
owner of the Masterpiece Cakeshop in 
Lakewood, Colo., was charged with violating 
it. 
In 2012, he said he politely declined to make 
a wedding cake for Charles Craig and David 
Mullins, who had planned to marry in 
Massachusetts but then have a reception in 
their home state of Colorado. They lodged a 
complaint with the state civil rights 
commission. 
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The commission ruled that Phillips’ refusal to 
make the wedding cake violated the 
provision in the state’s anti-discrimination 
law that says businesses open to the public 
may not deny service to customers based on 
their race, religion, gender or sexual 
orientation. The panel ordered him to provide 
wedding cakes on an equal basis for same-sex 
couples. 
Phillips appealed to the Supreme Court, 
arguing he deserved a religious exemption 
based on the 1st Amendment’s guarantee of 
freedom of speech and free exercise of 
religion. His lawyers say he refused to 
comply with the commission ruling while his 
appeal proceeded. 
They described Phillips as a “cake artist” who 
will “not create cakes celebrating any 
marriage that is contrary to his understanding 
of biblical teaching.” 
They also said he has refused to make cakes 
to celebrate Halloween or create baked goods 
that have “anti-American or anti-family 
themes” or carry profane messages. 
“They said you have to create cakes for same-
sex couples, so he removed himself from the 
market. He chose to stop making wedding 
cakes,” said Jeremy Tedesco, a lawyer for the 
Alliance Defending Freedom, who appealed 
on Phillips’ behalf. 
Lawyers for the state commission and the 
American Civil Liberties Union urged the 
court to turn down the appeal in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop vs. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission. They said it could open a 
“gaping hole” in civil rights laws if business 
owners could cite their religious beliefs as a 
valid basis for denying service to certain 
customers. 
“This has always been about more than a 
cake,” Mullins said in a statement. 
“Businesses should not be allowed to violate 
the law and discriminate against us because 
of who we are and who we love.” 
James Esseks, director of the ACLU’s LGBT 
Project said the “law is squarely on David and 
Charlie’s side because when businesses are 
open to the public, they’re supposed to be 
open to everyone.” 
But Justice Kennedy, who wrote the court’s 
opinion upholding same-sex marriages, has 
also joined the court’s conservatives in 
upholding religious exemptions. He joined 
the 5-4 majority in the Hobby Lobby case, 
which said the Christian family who owned a 
chain of craft stores could refuse to provide 
their employees the full range of 
contraceptives called for by the federal 
healthcare law. 
Public opinion polls show that most 
Americans support the rights of same-sex 
couples to marry and that support has steadily 
increased, even among groups who have been 
opposed in the past, notably evangelical 
Christians. 
Advocates on the Christian right, however, 
say the government should not force 
believers to endorse marriages that conflict 
with their faith. 
Two years ago, the justices turned down a 
similar appeal from a wedding photographer 
in New Mexico. Since then, the issue has 
arisen in several other states whose laws 
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forbid discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. 
The appeal in the Colorado case has been 
pending since January, suggesting the 
justices were closely split on what to do. 
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, a Colorado native 
and a well-known defender of religious 
liberty claims, joined the court in April. 
It takes only four votes to hear the case, and 
on the last day before the summer recess, the 
justices announced they would hear the issue 
during the fall. 
Separately Monday, the court in a 6-3 ruling 
struck down an Arkansas law regarding birth 
certificates that prevented adding the names 
of both parents in a same-sex union. The law 
called for including only the biological 
parent. 
The court, in an unsigned opinion, said this 
rule denied the same-sex couple the same 
rights as opposite-sex couples and was 
therefore unconstitutional. 
The court noted that in Arkansas if an 
opposite-sex couple used artificial 
insemination with an anonymous sperm 
donor to have a child, the mother’s husband 
in such a case would be listed on the birth 
certificate. 
Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito 
Jr. and Gorsuch dissented in that case, Pavan 
vs. Smith.
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“A Supreme Court mystery: Has Roberts embraced same-sex marriage 
ruling?” 
 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
July 16, 2017 
 
A Supreme Court mystery: Has Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts Jr. embraced the court’s 
same-sex marriage decision that he so 
passionately protested two years ago? 
The “does-he-doesn’t-he” question is 
prompted by a case that the court decided 
without oral arguments at the end of the 
recently completed term. The justices ruled in 
favor of same-sex couples, but did so in a way 
that has turned those who closely follow the 
court’s actions into a debating society. 
And the answer could be important for more 
than curiosity’s sake. The court has accepted 
for its next term a case dealing with whether 
business owners must provide services for 
same-sex unions even if they are religiously 
opposed, and the nation’s courts are filling 
with cases about how far the 2015 same-sex 
marriage ruling extends. 
Usually, there is no question about where the 
justices stand. One of the Supreme Court’s 
boasts about its transparency is that justices 
put their names on their work, joining the 
reasoning of a majority or dissenting opinion 
or writing their own. 
“Except sometimes they don’t,” said Joshua 
Matz, a former clerk to Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy and proprietor of the legal blog 
Take Care. 
And one of the times they don’t is when 
issuing a “per curiam” decision, an unsigned 
opinion that is filed on behalf of the court. 
In Pavan v. Smith , the court summarily 
overruled a decision of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court and agreed with same-sex 
married couples who said the state treated 
them differently than heterosexual married 
couples when issuing birth certificates. The 
state automatically listed spouses of mothers 
on birth certificates when the spouse was a 
man, but not when she was a woman. 
The per curiam decision said that Arkansas’s 
justices had failed to properly apply the 
court’s landmark decision that same-sex 
couples have a constitutional right to marry, 
Obergefell v. Hodges. 
“Differential treatment infringes Obergefell’s 
commitment to provide same-sex couples 
‘the constellation of benefits that the states 
have linked to marriage,’ ” the unsigned 
opinion said. 
The court’s three most conservative justices 
objected. Justices Clarence Thomas and 
Samuel A. Alito Jr. joined a dissent written 
by Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, which said the 
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court should have accepted the case for full 
briefing and argument because the outcome 
wasn’t nearly as clear-cut as the majority 
claimed. 
“Nothing in Obergefell spoke (let alone 
clearly) to the question” raised in the 
Arkansas case, Gorsuch wrote. 
(Parenthetically, the parenthetical in that line 
has been interpreted by some as a shot at 
Kennedy, who wrote the Obergefell ruling 
and for whom Gorsuch clerked on the 
Supreme Court. 
Noticeably absent from the dissent was 
Roberts, who was on the losing side in 
Obergefell. He issued a strongly worded 
dissent and underlined his opposition by 
reading a summary of it from the bench — 
the first and only time he has taken such a 
step in more than a decade on the court. 
Same-sex couples are justified in celebrating 
their newly found right, he said, but he added 
tartly that “the Constitution has nothing to do 
with it.” 
But if Roberts wasn’t with the named 
dissenters in the recent Arkansas case, does 
that mean he was with the unnamed majority? 
Constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky 
said during a recent panel discussion at the 
University of California at Irvine Law School 
that the answer was yes and the vote should 
be seen as 6 to 3. 
Law professor Leah Litman said she wasn’t 
sure Chemerinsky could make such a claim. 
But another panelist, Alex Kozinski, the 
celebrated and conservative longtime judge 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th 
Circuit, was definitive: 
Yes, Roberts was in the majority. 
When there is a published opinion and a 
justice does not note being in dissent, said 
Kozinski (yet another person who used to call 
Kennedy boss), the justice has signed on to 
the majority. 
“No doubt about it,” Kozinski said. 
Will Baude, a University of Chicago law 
professor and former Roberts clerk who has 
closely studied the per curiam decisions, 
rulings on emergency filings and stay 
requests that collectively have been referred 
to as the court’s “shadow docket,” is 
skeptical of Kozinski’s pronouncement. 
“We don’t know for sure, but I think he’s 
probably wrong,” Baude said. 
Baude said it is clear that justices do not 
always note their dissents when it comes to 
dealing with emergency stay applications, for 
instance. And he said it seems likely that 
there are times when justices simply don’t 
note their dissents. 
Matz titled his commentary “No, the Chief 
Justice Did Not Just Embrace Obergefell” 
and said there could be several reasons for a 
justice to secretly dissent: “For instance, to 
conceal one’s views from the public and 
thereby retain future flexibility; as a display 
of good will to the majority or the institution 
as a whole; or to avoid needlessly creating the 
appearance of conflict.” 
Perhaps Roberts didn’t like Gorsuch’s 
dissent. Perhaps the chief thought the 
Arkansas case not worth taking. 
Because the five members of the Obergefell 
majority — Kennedy and Justices Ruth 
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Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — remain, 
Roberts certainly knows there is no way of 
dislodging Obergefell as precedent, and 
perhaps he thought it covered the Arkansas 
case, whether he liked it or not. 
Kozinski said during the University of 
California at Irvine panel that judges know 
when they are outnumbered and it is not 
worth taking up a case you are sure to lose. 
“It’s a matter of arithmetic,” he said. 
But it doesn’t dictate what a judge might do 
in the next case, he said, if circumstances — 
for instance, the court’s membership — 
change.
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“Gay Rights Groups Seek One More Win From Justice Kennedy” 
 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
July 17, 2017 
 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the greatest 
judicial champion of gay rights in the 
nation’s history, will turn 81 on Sunday. 
Rumors that he would retire in June turned 
out to be wrong, but he will not be on the 
Supreme Court forever. 
Gay rights groups hope to score one more 
victory before he leaves the court. The goal 
this time is nationwide protection against 
employment discrimination. 
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinions 
in all four of the court’s landmark gay rights 
rulings, culminating in the 2015 decision 
establishing a constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage. But there is more work to be done, 
said Suzanne B. Goldberg, a law professor at 
Columbia. 
“Marriage equality did not bring an end to 
sexual-orientation discrimination in this 
country,” she said. 
The same-sex marriage decision left gay men 
and lesbians in a strange position, said David 
S. Cohen, a law professor at Drexel 
University. 
“You can get married, put a picture on your 
desk from the wedding and then be fired 
because the boss sees the picture,” he said. 
“Marriage was certainly an important step, 
but it doesn’t change the fact that there is no 
federal law protecting against sexual-
orientation discrimination in employment or 
housing or education or public 
accommodations,” Professor Cohen said. 
“Only about 20 states offer protection under 
their own state laws.” 
This month, the gay rights group Lambda 
Legal announced that it would ask the 
Supreme Court to hear a case that could 
prohibit employers from discriminating 
against gay and lesbian workers. The group 
argues that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, which prohibits workplace 
discrimination based on sex, also bans 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Most federal appeals courts have rejected the 
theory. But in April, by an 8-to-3 vote, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, said Title VII 
covered gay people. “It would require 
considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ 
from ‘sexual orientation,’” Chief Judge 
Diane Wood wrote for the majority. 
She relied on the language and logic of Title 
VII, and on Supreme Court precedents. 
In 1989, for instance, the Supreme Court said 
discrimination against workers because they 
did not conform to gender stereotypes was a 
form of sex discrimination. Being a lesbian, 
Judge Wood wrote, “represents the ultimate 
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case of failure to conform to the female 
stereotype (at least as understood in a place 
such as modern America, which views 
heterosexuality as the norm and other forms 
of sexuality as exceptional).” 
In dissent, Judge Diane S. Sykes said the 
majority had overreached. “It’s 
understandable that the court is impatient to 
protect lesbians and gay men from workplace 
discrimination without waiting for Congress 
to act,” she wrote. “Legislative change is 
arduous and can be slow to come. But we’re 
not authorized to amend Title VII by 
interpretation.” 
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in April created 
a split among the federal appeals courts, and 
such disagreements often prompt the 
Supreme Court to step in. But the defendant 
in the case, an Indiana community college, 
quickly announced that it would not appeal. 
Legal experts said it was only a matter of time 
until the Supreme Court addressed the issue. 
“The odds that the Supreme Court grants 
review of this question in the near future are 
high,” Joshua Matz wrote in April on Take 
Care, a legal blog. “It is no exaggeration to 
say that Title VII’s application to gays and 
lesbians now ranks among the most 
important open questions in U.S. civil rights 
law.” 
The next case is now on the horizon. It 
concerns Jameka Evans, who says a Georgia 
hospital discriminated against her because 
she is a lesbian. In March, a divided three-
judge panel of the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta, 
ruled that Title VII did not cover 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
Gregory R. Nevins, a lawyer with Lambda 
Legal who represents Ms. Evans, chose his 
words carefully in discussing whether the 
odds of winning at the Supreme Court would 
dim if Justice Kennedy retired. 
“We think we have good reasons for 
optimism with the current composition of the 
court,” he said. “You always want the setup 
that you feel comfortable with, rather than 
any variation of it.” 
“Justice Kennedy has viewed the 
mistreatment of lesbian, gay and bisexual 
individuals with a jaundiced eye,” Mr. Nevis 
added. 
Legal scholars were more direct. “Kennedy is 
more sympathetic to gay rights than his 
replacement is likely to be,” said Andrew M. 
Koppelman, a law professor at Northwestern 
who wrote a 1994 law review article called 
“Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and 
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination.” 
Professor Cohen, who agreed that Title VII 
should be read to cover sexual-orientation 
discrimination, said there was reason for gay 
rights groups to move quickly. “Certainly 
anything trying to protect people from 
discrimination in any form is going to fare 
better with Justice Kennedy on the court than 
with another Trump appointee,” he said, 
“although I certainly don’t think it’s a slam 
dunk with Justice Kennedy.” 
Justice Kennedy has never embraced the 
theory that sexual-orientation discrimination 
is a form of sex discrimination. But he 
seemed intrigued by the question in 2013 
when the Supreme Court heard arguments 
about Proposition 8, a referendum that 
banned same-sex marriage in California. 
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“Do you believe this can be treated as a 
gender-based classification?” Justice 
Kennedy asked a lawyer defending the ban. 
He did not wait for an answer. “It’s a difficult 
question,” Justice Kennedy said. “I’ve been 
trying to wrestle with it.”
43 
  
“Court Rules Baker Can’t Refuse to Make Wedding Cake for Gay 
Couple” 
 
The Wall Street Journal 
Jacob Gershman and Tamara Audi 
August 13, 2015 
 
A Colorado appeals court on Thursday ruled 
that a Denver-area baker cannot refuse to 
make a wedding cake for a gay couple based 
on his religious belief. 
The decision comes as religious 
conservatives opposed to gay marriage fight 
to carve out exemptions to same-sex 
marriage and antidiscrimination laws—
especially in the wake of the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling earlier this year legalizing same-
sex marriage nationwide. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument by lawyers for the cake-shop owner 
who argued that forcing him to create and sell 
a cake to a gay couple planning a wedding 
celebration violated his First Amendment 
rights. 
The ruling is the latest to limit the rights of 
religious business owners involved in 
wedding services to turn away same-sex 
couples. 
“There’s a growing body of court decisions 
saying that while religion is central to what 
makes America America, religion can’t be 
used as an excuse to discriminate,” said 
James Esseks, the director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union LGBT project. The 
ACLU represented the couple in the case. 
Religious conservatives said the ruling was a 
mistake. Lawyers for the bakery said they 
would consider appealing. 
“Government has a duty to protect people’s 
freedom to follow their beliefs personally and 
professionally rather than force them to adopt 
the government’s views,” said Jeremy 
Tedesco, senior counsel for Alliance 
Defending Freedom, who argued the 
Colorado case. 
The dispute started in 2012, when Charlie 
Craig and David Mullins visited Masterpiece 
Cakeshop in Lakewood and requested a cake 
to celebrate their planned wedding. The 
couple had plans to marry in Massachusetts 
but wanted to celebrate with their friends in 
Colorado, which at the time didn’t permit 
same-sex marriages. 
Masterpiece owner Jack Phillips declined the 
couple’s request, telling them he didn’t create 
wedding cakes for same-sex weddings 
because of his religious beliefs, according to 
the opinion, which said he advised the two 
men that he would be happy to sell them other 
baked goods. 
“Phillips believes that decorating cakes is a 
form of art, that he can honor God through his 
artistic talents, and that he would displease 
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God by creating cakes for same-sex 
marriages,” the opinion said. 
The couple then filed a complaint with the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, alleging 
discrimination based on sexual orientation 
under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. 
After a commission judge ruled for the 
couple—a decision affirmed by the 
commission itself—Mr. Phillips took his case 
to the appellate court. 
“Masterpiece does not convey a message 
supporting same-sex marriages merely by 
abiding by the law and serving its customers 
equally,” the court said in its ruling Thursday. 
Religious conservatives opposed to gay 
marriage have tried to soften their rhetoric 
about homosexuality and their approach to 
the LGBT community, while maintaining 
their opposition to same-sex marriage. 
Some church leaders fear the Supreme Court 
ruling could result in discrimination against 
religious people, and have said they would 
continue to fight for exemptions for business 
owners and religiously affiliated 
organizations. 
“What happens next is that states should 
respond with appropriate legislation that 
would prevent the government from 
penalizing or coercing anyone because they 
act on the belief that marriage is a union 
between one man and one woman,” said 
Roger Severino, the director of the DeVos 
Center for Religion and Civil Society at the 
Heritage Foundation, a conservative think 
tank. 
But civil-liberties groups say continuing legal 
fights aren’t indicative of a larger cultural 
battle. 
“There’s a small number of conflicts and the 
courts are resolving them the same way every 
time,” the ACLU’s Mr. Esseks said. 
Gay couples have won similar cases in other 
states. In 2013, the highest court in New 
Mexico ruled that the owners of an 
Albuquerque wedding-photography 
company can’t deny services to same-sex 
couples. 
Earlier this summer, the Oregon labor 
commissioner ordered the owners of 
“Sweetcakes by Melissa” bakery to pay a 
lesbian couple $135,000 in damages “for 
emotional and mental suffering resulting 
from” its refusal to bake them a wedding 
cake. 
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“Colorado baker wants U.S. Supreme Court to hear gay wedding cake 
case” 
 
The Denver Post 
Yesenia Robles 
July 22, 2016 
 
Masterpiece Cakeshop owner Jack Phillips is 
now asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear 
his case after a lower court ruled he was 
wrong in refusing to make a wedding cake for 
a same-sex couple by citing his religious 
beliefs. 
His attorneys filed the petition Friday. 
“No one — not Jack or anyone else — should 
be forced by the government to further a 
message that they cannot in good conscience 
promote,” said attorney Jeremy Tedesco in a 
statement released by the non-profit legal 
organization Alliance Defending Freedom. 
“And that’s what this case is about.” 
Last month the Colorado Supreme Court 
decided it would not hear the case of the 
Lakewood baker. 
Mark Silverstein, the legal director for 
American Civil Liberties Unit of Colorado, 
said the organization intends to file a 
response to the petition. 
“As we’ve argued and the courts have 
consistently and correctly ruled in this case, 
everyone has a right to their religious 
beliefs,” Silverstein said. “But business 
owners cannot rely on those beliefs as an 
excuse to discriminate against prospective 
customers.” 
In 2012, Charlie Craig and David Mullins 
were turned away by Phillips when they 
requested a custom wedding cake. Mullins 
and Craig planned to marry in Massachusetts 
and wanted a cake to celebrate in Colorado. 
Phillips refused, citing his religious beliefs. 
In December 2013, administrative law Judge 
Robert N. Spencer said offering the same 
services to gay couples as heterosexual 
couples did not violate Phillips’ rights to free 
speech and does not prevent him from 
exercising his religious freedom. 
The appeals courts later upheld that ruling, 
stating that the Colorado Anti-Discrimination 
Act does not compel the cake shop owner to 
endorse any religious views. Instead, it 
prohibits Phillips from discriminating against 
customers based on sexual orientation. 
Tedesco said Friday afternoon that many 
similar cases are circulating the lower courts 
throughout the country. 
Tedesco said the only similar case that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has been asked to hear is 
one about a photographer in New Mexico 
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who refused to photograph a gay couple. The 
court did not take up that case, but Tedesco 
said that wasn’t a surprise. 
“Our view is it’s only a matter of time before 
the Supreme Court takes one of these cases,” 
Tedesco said. “It’s a really crucial issue of 
First Amendment law. 
47 
  
“Opinion: The sleeper issue in the 'gay wedding cake' controversy” 
 
Los Angeles Times 
Michael McGough 
August 17, 2015 
 
Social conservatives have rallied behind 
bakers and photographers who don’t want to 
provide services for same-sex weddings. But 
the courts continue to be unsympathetic. The 
latest rebuff was a decision last week by the 
Colorado Court of Appeals in the case of Jack 
C. Phillips, a Christian baker who refused to 
create a wedding cake for a gay couple who 
planned to marry in Massachusetts but 
celebrate their union in Colorado. 
The court’s opinion rejects arguments that 
forcing Phillips to supply a cake to Charlie 
Craig and David Mullins violated Phillips’ 
freedom of religion or his 1st Amendment 
right against being compelled to convey a 
“celebratory” message he doesn’t believe in. 
But to reach those questions, the court had to 
reject another legal claim by Phillips that 
hasn’t received enough attention: that in 
refusing to provide the cake, he wasn’t 
engaging in anti-gay discrimination. Phillips 
noted that he was happy to provide Craig and 
Mullins with other baked goods. (Less 
persuasively, he floated the idea that 
heterosexual couples might also enter into a 
same-sex marriage.) 
The appeals court was quick -- maybe too 
quick -- to accept the idea that refusal to bake 
a cake for a same-sex wedding is tantamount 
to discriminating against customers on the 
basis of their sexual orientation. The court 
ruled that “the act of same-sex marriage is 
closely correlated to Craig’s and Mullins’ 
sexual orientation.” Therefore, an 
administrative law judge hadn't erred in 
concluding that Phillips’ refusal to bake the 
cake was “because of” the couple’s sexual 
orientation. 
The appeals court backed that conclusion 
with a citation from a 2010 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision. That case concerned a 
Christian group at the UC Hastings College 
of Law that required its leaders to affirm, and 
live by, the traditional view that sex is 
permissible only within heterosexual 
marriage. 
The law school had refused to recognize the 
Christian Legal Society chapter because, it 
said, the group was in violation of a policy 
that membership and leadership positions in 
such groups must be open to “all comers.” 
Student groups, couldn’t discriminate on the 
basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, 
ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual 
orientation.” 
The Christian group argued that it excluded 
some students not because of their sexual 
orientation, but rather “on the basis of a 
conjunction of conduct and the belief that the 
conduct is not wrong.” In other words, 
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celibate gays who endorsed the group’s 
Christian moral theology were welcome 
despite their sexual orientation. 
Writing for the court, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg rejected that argument, noting that 
in gay rights cases, the court had “declined to 
distinguish between status and conduct.” 
To a lot of gay rights supporters, it’s self-
evident that a refusal to bake a cake for a 
same-sex wedding is discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation. But there are 
people, such as Phillips and the bishops of the 
Roman Catholic Church, who insist on a 
distinction between sexual orientation and 
sexual activity or participation in a same-sex 
marriage. 
And here’s another question raised by David 
French in the National Review: If 
discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is interpreted in broad terms, 
would a similarly broad definition of racial 
discrimination require a baker to provide a 
Confederate-flag cake for a white 
supremacist group lest he be accused of bias 
against whites? (Phillips said he also objected 
to baking cakes that incorporate racist 
symbols.) 
The decision in the Christian Legal Society 
case was 5 to 4. (One justice in the majority, 
John Paul Stevens, has since retired, but his 
successor, Elena Kagan, likely would rule the 
same way.) So it seems that bakers, wedding 
photographers and other merchants who live 
in jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation won’t be 
able to argue that “we’re not anti-gay, we’re 
just anti-gay-marriage.” 
That leaves arguments based on freedom of 
religion or freedom of speech, but those don’t 
seem very promising either. A New Mexico 
wedding photographer who refused to take 
pictures of a same-sex celebration appealed a 
decision against her to the U.S. Supreme 
Court; last year the justices refused even to 
hear the case. 
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“Cake-bakers have the right to draw a line in the icing” 
 
The New York Post 
David Harsanyi 
June 30, 2017 
 
This week, the Supreme Court agreed to hear 
the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop owner 
Jack Phillips, the man who refused to create 
a specialty wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple in Colorado in 2012. Yet the stories 
that dominate coverage distort the public’s 
understanding of the case and its serious 
implications. 
For one thing, no matter how many times 
people repeat it, the case isn’t about 
discrimination or challenging gay marriage. 
But when the news first broke, USA Today, 
for example, tweeted, “The Supreme Court 
has agreed to reopen the national debate over 
same-sex marriage.” 
The headline (and story) on the Web site was 
worse; it read, “Supreme Court will hear 
religious liberty challenge to gay weddings.” 
Others similarly framed the case. 
There is an impulse to frame every issue as a 
clash between the tolerant and the closed-
minded. But the Masterpiece case doesn’t 
challenge, undermine or relitigate the issue of 
same-sex marriage. Gay marriage wasn’t 
even legal in Colorado when this incident 
occurred. 
So, The Associated Press’ headline, 
“Supreme Court to Decide If Baker Can 
Refuse Gay Couple Wedding Cake,” and 
story are also wrong. 
As is The New York Times headline 
“Justices to Hear Case on Baker’s Refusal to 
Serve Gay Couple,” which was later changed 
to the even worse headline “Justices to Hear 
Case on Religious Objections to Same-Sex 
Marriage.” 
A person with only passing interest in this 
case might be led to believe that Phillips is 
fighting to hang a “No Gays Allowed” sign 
in his shop. In truth, he never refused to serve 
a gay couple. He didn’t even really refuse to 
sell David Mullins and Charlie Craig a 
wedding cake. 
Everything in his shop was available to gays 
and straights and anyone else who walked in 
his door. 
What Phillips did was refuse to use his skills 
to design and bake a unique cake for a gay 
wedding. 
Like many other bakers, florists, 
photographers and musicians — and millions 
of other Christians — Phillips holds genuine 
longstanding religious convictions. If 
Mullins and Craig had demanded that 
Phillips create an erotic-themed cake, the 
baker would have similarly refused for 
religious reasons, just as he had with other 
customers. 
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If a couple had asked him to design a 
specialty cake that read “Congrats on the 
abortion, Jenny!” I’m certain he would have 
refused them as well, even though abortions 
are legal. It’s not the people; it’s the message. 
In its tortured decision, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals admitted as much, contending that 
while Phillips didn’t overtly discriminate 
against the couple, “the act of same-sex 
marriage is closely correlated to Craig’s and 
Mullins’ sexual orientation,” so it could 
divine his real intentions. 
In other words, the threshold for denying 
religious liberty and free expression is the 
presence of advocacy or a political opinion 
that conflates with faith. The court has 
effectively tasked itself with determining 
when religion is allowed to matter to you. 
Or, in other words, if SCOTUS upholds the 
lower-court ruling, it will empower unelected 
civil-rights commissions — which are 
typically stacked with hard-left authoritarians 
— to decide when your religious actions are 
appropriate. 
How could any honest person believe this 
was the Constitution’s intent? There was a 
time, I’m told, when the state wouldn’t 
substantially burden religious exercise and 
would use the least restrictive means to 
further compelling interests. Today, the state 
can substantially burden a Christian because 
he has hurt the wrong person’s feelings. 
Judging from the e-mails and social-media 
reactions I’ve gotten regarding this case, 
people are not only instinctively antagonistic 
because of the players involved but also 
because they don’t understand the facts. 
In this era of identity politics, some have been 
programmed to reflexively side with the 
person making accusations of status-based 
discrimination, all in an effort to empower 
the state to coerce a minority of people to see 
the world their way. 
Well, not all people. In 2014, a Christian 
activist named William Jack went to a 
Colorado bakery and requested two cakes in 
the shape of a Bible, one to be decorated with 
the Bible verses “God hates sin. Psalm 45:7” 
and “Homosexuality is a detestable sin. 
Leviticus 18:22,” and the other cake to be 
decorated with another passage. 
The bakery refused. Even though Christians 
are a protected group, the Colorado Civil 
Rights Division threw out the case. 
The American Civil Liberties Union called 
the passages “obscenities.” I guess the Bible 
doesn’t “correlate” closely enough with a 
Christian’s identity. 
Or perhaps we’ve finally established a state 
religion: It’s run on the dogma of “social 
justice.” 
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“Using ‘free speech’ as a cover for discrimination” 
 
Boston Globe 
July 6, 2017 
 
Colorado cake maker Jack Phillips is devout 
about his artistry in icing and fondant. He’s 
also devout about his Christian faith, so much 
so that he believes it would be deeply sinful 
to prepare a wedding cake for a same-sex 
couple. Last week, the US Supreme Court 
agreed to hear his case, and arguments in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission — one in a series 
of efforts to fence in the galloping acceptance 
of same-sex marriage — could come as soon 
as this fall. 
Events were set in motion in 2012, when 
David Mullins and Charlie Craig, who 
planned to marry in Massachusetts, stopped 
into Masterpiece Cakeshop in Lakewood, 
Colo., to order a wedding cake. Phillips 
refused to serve them, even though Colorado 
law says businesses open to the public can’t 
discriminate based on sexual orientation. 
Phillips, of course, has a constitutionally 
protected First Amendment right to profess 
his faith. And he’s made it clear there’s no 
room for compromise, telling The New York 
Times: “I believe that the Bible teaches that 
homosexuality is wrong, and that to 
participate in a sin is wrong for me. For me to 
take part in it against my will is compelling 
me to make a statement that I don’t want to 
make.” But there’s another right hanging in 
the balance, rooted in the 14th Amendment 
and codified by the Supreme Court in 2015: 
the right to same-sex marriage. 
Historically, courts have tried to strike an 
equitable balance between expanded civil 
rights and religious expression. Since the 
Civil Rights Act was enacted, in 1964, 
lawmakers and the courts have allowed some 
exemptions but have tended to draw the line 
when claims of religious freedom are used to 
justify discrimination. As James Esseks, 
director of the ACLU LGBT project put it: 
“You have freedom to believe and to preach 
your faith, until your actions harm other 
people.” 
The Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges 
decision two years ago was transformative, 
addressing vital claims to liberty and dignity 
for millions of gay Americans. Phillips’s 
protest also comes at a time when national 
support for same-sex marriage is at an all-
time high, according to a recent Pew 
Research Center poll. A majority of 
Americans surveyed — 62 percent — now 
support gay marriage, including two-thirds of 
Catholics and 68 percent of mainline 
Protestants. And while white evangelical 
Christians aren’t exactly waving rainbow 
flags, support for same-sex marriage has 
grown from 27 percent in 2016 to 35 percent 
today, according to Pew. 
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There’s a broader First Amendment principle 
at stake, however. The Phillips case is 
another alarming assault on freedom of 
speech, part of an effort by businesses large 
and small to turn that most essential 
constitutional right into an antiregulatory 
tool. This “compelled speech” doctrine is 
already making its way through Congress and 
the court system, most notably in a case 
involving business groups fighting a 2010 
law that requires them to disclose whether 
their products contain minerals linked to 
warlords in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. In June, the US House passed the 
Financial CHOICE Act, which includes a 
pro-business provision to repeal the conflict-
mineral disclosure. The US Senate should 
reject the bill, which also rolls back Dodd-
Frank reforms. And the Supreme Court 
justices should recognize that the 
Masterpiece Cakeshop case is not about 
forcing speech, but about banning 
discriminatory conduct. The Colorado 
cakemaker should be free to worship as he 
pleases, but not to abrogate settled civil rights 
law under the guise of the First Amendment.
